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TRUSTS & ESTATES LAW—TRUST PROTECTORS—INCREASING TRUST 
FLEXIBILITY AND SECURITY WHILE DECREASING UNCERTAINTY OF 
LIABILITIES FOR DOING SO: HOW AMENDING ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-
808 TO BETTER CONFORM WITH THE MODERN TREND OF CLARIFYING 
TRUST PROTECTION COULD EFFECTIVELY END THE FIDUCIARY GUESSING 






The year is 2040.1 Sadly, death found you some twenty years ago. You 
lived a remarkable life though, blessed with a long and rewarding career in 
art. As it turns out, your paintings have noticeably increased in value over 
the past few years. So much so that the University you left them to in a trust 
agreement recently made quite the profit when it sold them to a modern art 
museum in a neighboring state. The University had fallen into financial 
hardship. But with your thoughtful contribution of more than $60 million in 
now-liquidated artwork and the blessing of a court, it will worry no more. 
Before you died, you executed a testamentary trust that conveyed your 
gallery to the University to maintain as trustee for the benefit of the public. 
You probably did not recognize it then, but your attorney seemingly failed 
to get your full input before drafting the trust. The limitations he placed on 
the use of your property were astounding. He even went so far as to state 
that the University could only display your gallery at the University to edu- 
cate the public. Even more startling, he stated that the University could nev- 
er sell the gallery for profit. Indeed, the Attorney General nearly prevented 
the University from selling your gallery, claiming that it was obligated to 
keep the pieces on display for the public per the terms of your trust. 
The Attorney General alleged that the University breached its fiduciary 
duty as trustee to maintain your gallery for the benefit of its beneficiaries. 
He argued the University must continue following the directions you left for 
it in your trust as they reflected your “intent” and because there were more 
sensible  ways  for  the  University  to  increase  revenue.  Specifically,  he 
thought you deliberately included the provision that restricted the University 
from selling the paintings for profit. Luckily, the court resolved his misun- 
derstanding. 
The court knew of your giving spirit; unlike the Attorney General, it 
was prepared to develop some theories of its own as to why your trust in- 
 
 
1.   The following facts are similar to those in Georgia O’Keeffe Foundation (Museum) 
v. Fisk University, 312 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) and In re Fisk University, 392 
S.W.3d 582 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). 
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cluded such unrealistic constraints. As you have probably figured out by 
now, yes, the court did decipher your intent to restrict the University from 
selling your gallery, except where the terms of the sale appear reasonable 
and fair to both parties. At first, the University tried to sell the entire gallery. 
Nevertheless, the University and Museum reached a compromise for a par-
tial sale so that the University could still display some of the paintings, some 
of the time. Rest at ease—the court found this sufficient for the transfer of 
your property.2 
Solutions for unsuccessful efforts to enforce trust conditions and ad-
here to the intent of the unavailable settlor, as in the above factual scenario, 
are the subject of this note. For this deceased settlor, any efforts were too 
little and came too late. Unlike her, however, trust settlors today can gain 
the benefit of a sophisticated drafting technique that estate planners across 
the nation are presently utilizing: trust protection.  
“The emergence of trust protectors is one of the most significant recent 
developments in American trust law.”3 A trust protector is a third-party trust 
participant who, in the simplest of terms, plays referee between the trustee 
and beneficiaries of a trust.4 Most often, protectors have the authority, not 
only to arbitrate disputes between trust parties, but also to modify or amend 
a trust’s terms or to direct the actions of a trustee.5 The appointment of a 
protector lessens the influence a court can have over trust dispositions—like 
the “rationalized” deviation from trust language as seen above—by vesting 
authority in a trusted individual to function as a “representative” of the set-
tlor, charged with enforcing her instructions. 
The trust protector played a significant role in American trust law in 
the last decade.6 The protector’s infancy is misleading as its office can add 
  
 2. For a look at using trust protectors in charitable trusts specifically, see Richard C. 
Ausness, The Role of Trust Protectors in American Trust Law, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
319, 348–49 (2010). See also JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE AND TRUST 
PLANNING 276–79 (2005). 
 3. Ausness, supra note 2, at 321; Gregory S. Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will 
Watch The Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2807, 2807 (2006). 
 4. See Philip J. Ruce, The Trustee and the Trust Protector: A Question of Fiduciary 
Power. Should a Trust Protector be Held to a Fiduciary Standard?, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 67, 72 
(2010). Based on the specific needs of the parties involved, settlors typically name either 
personal protectors (e.g., family members, friends, coworkers), or professional/corporate 
protectors (e.g., accountants, financial advisors, banking institutions), individually or by 
committee. Id. at 71–72. In states without detailed trust-protection legislation, many attorneys 
simply refer to trust protectors as “independent” or “special” trustees, and generally define 
them according to Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 672. They use them to achieve the 
same purposes, though. This is sometimes the case with trust advisors as well, but to a much 
lesser extent.  
 5. John P.C. Duncan & Anita M. Sarafa, Achieve the Promise—and Limit the Risk—of 
Multi-Participant Trusts, 36 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 769, 782 (2011).  
 6. Ausness, supra note 2, at 324. 
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far-reaching versatility to trust management.7 Some commentators predict 
the title “trust protector” will be mere commonplace by the end of the dec-
ade.8 
The trust protector’s significance to modern trust law best presents it-
self after first examining the office in its origins offshore.9 After a discussion 
of the trust protector’s migration to the states, this note examines the varying 
purposes domestic settlors now have for using protectors,10 concluding with 
a description of the recent, legislative trend of enacting protection legisla-
tion.11 Next, the trust protector’s role in modern trust law is discussed in 
relation to the broad goal of trust flexibility.12 The note references actual 
Arkansas proceedings to illustrate how those functions add the flexibility 
and security sought by contemporary settlors.13 
Unfortunately, however, those presently making use of trust protectors 
do so virtually unaided by precedent. Unless operating in a jurisdiction with 
guiding legislation, trust protectors risk incurring potential liabilities with 
incertitude. By posing a series of hypothetical situations, this note will 
closely examine the potential liabilities that Arkansas attorneys and trust 
officers may incur if currently using trust protectors.14 To end, this note will 
propose a new piece of legislation for the Arkansas Legislature’s considera-
tion that will remedy many of the liability concerns shared by estate plan-
ners and trust settlors, while, at the same time, allowing property owners to 
gain the benefit that this unique trust party has to offer.15 
  
 7. See generally David M. Grant & Jeremy K. Cooper, Nevada Laws Provide Top 
Trust Situs, NEV. LAW, May 2010, at 22 (explaining that statutory provisions recognizing 
trust protectors allows for flexibility in the management of unforeseen circumstances); Stew-
art E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 
2763 (2006) (explaining that a trust protector has the ability to mitigate circumstances that 
could not possibly be foreseen, thus making up for the lack of foresight by the settler). 
 8. Brian K. Jones & Jerry D. Jones, Expect the Unexpected, TRUSTS & ESTATES 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 2012, at 14, 14–15, available at http://wealthmanagement.com/estate-
planning/expect-unexpected. 
 9. See infra Part II.A. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See infra Part II.D. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI; see also Grant & Cooper, supra note 7 (“Having a statutory provi-
sion recognizing trust protectors and establishing roles in which they may act allows the 
settlors of a trust to have the flexibility necessary to ensure the trust's proper administration 
and deal with unforeseen circumstances.”). 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Origins Abroad 
During the 1990s, nearly every state forbade self-settled spendthrift 
trusts.16 To gain insulation from creditors and tax liabilities, property owners 
began settling their trusts in foreign jurisdictions. The office of trust protec-
tor was established as a means of indirectly maintaining control over their 
trusts from afar.17  
At the settlor’s direction, trust protectors were, among other things, 
able to amend trust language or remove noncompliant trustees—despite the 
settlor’s absence and without judicial affirmation.18 At least to some degree, 
the protector became an extension of the settlor herself, standing in her 
shoes during periods of unavailability.19 
B. Recognition by Domestic Settlors 
Soon thereafter, several states enacted domestic-asset-protection legis-
lation that affords similar insulation to domestic settlors by permitting 
spendthrift protection over self-settled trusts.20 By vesting all interests in the 
trust—legal or equitable, present or contingent—with other parties, settlors 
remain vested with no interests subject to garnishment.21 Yet, they can still 
maintain control and use of the property much like those with offshore asset 
protection trusts by employing protectors to carry out their wishes.22 
Along with asset protection, property owners are now employing pro-
tectors as checks on trustees of support and special-needs trusts by enhanc-
ing discretionary oversight of interactions between beneficiaries and trus-
  
 16. Ausness, supra note 2, at 321–24. 
 17. Alexander, supra note 3.  
 18. See id.; John E. Sullivan III, Gutting the Rule Against Self-Settled Trusts: How the 
New Delaware Trust Law Competes with Offshore Trusts, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 423, 500–01 
(1998).  
 19. Sullivan, supra note 18, at 500–01.  
 20. E.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.40.110 (West Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 
34.40.110 (1997). 
 21. Christopher M. Reimer, The Undiscovered Country: Wyoming’s Emergence as a 
Leading Trust Situs Jurisdiction, 11 WYO. L. REV. 165, 180, 193–95 (2011). 
 22. Thomas O. Wells, Domestic Asset Protection Trusts—A Viable Estate and Wealth 
Preservation Alternative, FLA. B.J., May 2003, at 44. For a closer look at using protectors in 
spendthrift trusts specifically, see PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 257–69. For a closer 
look at using protectors in asset protection trusts specifically, see William A. Ensing, Using a 
Trust Protector in Asset Protection Planning, in 1 ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES, PLANNING 
WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 87 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 2002). 
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tees.23 The need for oversight on a more personal level can be particularly 
great where, as here, purposes for establishing the trust include providing for 
ill, young, irresponsible, or mentally-handicapped loved ones.24 
The most recent trend in American trust law for the use of protectors is 
their engagement in long-term trusts.25 Particularly in jurisdictions that have 
renounced or modified the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities,26 trust 
settlors are now retaining protectors to guide and oversee the operation of 
their dynasty trusts.27 In some jurisdictions, trusts have the potential to re-
main operative for longer than was once seen.28 In this context, protectors 
can function as mechanisms for achieving long-term security over family 
wealth by reacting to future changes in circumstances as the settlor would 
have if she were currently able.29 
Also, in response to unpredictable federal wealth-transfer tax regula-
tion, trust settlors are now using protectors to alter beneficial interests, 
amend trust language, transfer assets between trusts, and resettle trusts in 
low-cost jurisdictions.30 Over the past decade, the applicability of federal 
gift and estate taxes to trusts has been speculative at best.31 With the pro-
  
 23. See generally Charles D. Fox IV, How “Revocable” is “Irrevocable”? Obtaining 
Flexibility in Irrevocable Trusts, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 943, 965–66 (2007). 
 24. Ausness, supra note 2, at 329–31, 345–46 (noting also that trustees, and corporate 
trustees in particular, may be more concerned with asset protection and less knowledgeable 
about the specific needs of the individual beneficiaries). For a closer look at using protectors 
in support trusts specifically, see id. at 343–46. 
 25. See, e.g., Ruce, supra note 4, at 69–73; ALEXANDER A. BOVE, JR., The Trust Protec-
tor: Friend or Fiduciary?, in 2 ASSET PROTECTION STRATEGIES, WEALTH PRESERVATION 
PLANNING WITH DOMESTIC AND OFFSHORE ENTITIES 207, 234 (Alexander A. Bove, Jr. ed., 
2005). 
 26. “No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after 
some life in being at the creation of the interest.” JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES 191 (Little, Brown & Co., 4th ed. 1942) (1886). But see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 
34.27.051 (2000) (1,000 years); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564:24 (2003) (perpetual); UNIF. 
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 1, 8B U.L.A. 223 (2001) (90 years plus common-
law approach). To date, over half of the states have adopted the statutory rule (USRAP), 
including Arkansas. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-3-101 to -109 (Repl. 2012). For more on the 
statutory rule, see generally Lynn Foster, Fifty-One Flowers: Post-Perpetuities War Law and 
Arkansas’s Adoption of USRAP, 29 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 411 (2007). 
 27. Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 777–78. 
 28. Fox, supra note 23, at 949–51. 
 29. Id.; see Peter B. Tiernan, Evaluate and Draft Helpful Trust Protector Provisions, 38 
ESTPLN 24, 24, 35 (2011). For more on  perpetual and dynasty trusts generally, see general-
ly Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1303 (2003). 
 30. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 70–72; Ausness, supra note 2, at 333. 
 31. See John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, The Fundamentals of Wealth Transfer Tax 
Planning: 2011 and Beyond, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 385, 386–89 (2011); I.R.C. §§ 2601–2663 
(generation skipping transfer (GST) tax), 2101–2209 (federal estate taxes), 2501–2524 (fed-
eral gift taxes) (2012). 
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spect of tax reform in the next couple of years, property owners and estate 
planners face numerous tax-planning difficulties in the near future.32 In-
creasing trust flexibility at the outset is perhaps the only feasible way of 
dealing with such unpredictability.33 
C. Recognition by Legal Commentators 
Commentators have generally taken two alternate views of the office of 
trust protector. The first view envisions the trust protector as virtually anal-
ogous to a trust advisor.34 The second, which is the majority view, distin-
guishes a trust protector from a trust advisor based on their respective pow-
ers.35 
Proponents of the former view define a trust advisor as a trust party 
“who has power to control a trustee in the exercise of some or all of his 
powers.”36 However, powers to control a trustee can include veto powers, 
removal powers, appointment powers, modification powers, adjudication 
powers, and termination powers—all of which have recently been associated 
with protectors, and none of which are historically associated with advi-
sors.37 Moreover, these commentators rely on a law-review article entitled 
Trust Advisers, published in 1965, predating the presence of protectors in 
American trust law.38 Hence, the label “protector” appears nowhere in that 
  
 32. Miller & Maine, supra note 31, at 386–89. 
 33. Jones & Jones, supra note 8, at 16. Before granting broad, unrestrained powers, one 
should consider the potential adverse tax consequences. The tax consequences of granting 
powers to protectors primarily depends on the classification of the powers given as either 
personal or fiduciary, and whether the protector can use them in his favor or for his benefit. 
Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Trust Protector: Trust(y) Watchdog or Expensive Exotic Pet? 30 
EST. PLAN. 390, 395 (2003); see infra Part V. A personal power that can be exercised for the 
benefit of its holder might constitute a general power of appointment, which in turn could 
signify ownership of the property for income and estate tax purposes. Bove, supra, at 395; 
see infra Part V. Bove further contends that, despite a lack of language so restricting the 
power, a power not exercisable in favor of the protector or for his benefit would not amount 
to a general power for which tax liability would ensue. Bove, supra, at 395. For a discussion 
of the potential tax benefits gained by establishing ninety-year dynasty trusts in USRAP 
states, see Jesse Dukeminier, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities and the GST 
Tax: New Perils for Practitioners and New Opportunities, 30 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 185, 
207–10 (1995). For more on using protectors for tax purposes in GST tax trusts and Qualified 
Subchapter S trusts, see Ensing, supra note 22, at 95–96. 
 34. E.g., Trent S. Kiziah & Lori J. Campbell, Drafting to Effectuate Grantor’s Retention 
Desires with Respect to Publicly Held Securities, 46 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 199 (2011). 
 35. E.g., Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 781–83. 
 36. Kiziah & Campbell, supra note 34, at 298 n.186 (quoting Note, Trust Advisers, 78 
HARV. L. REV. 1230, 1230 (1965)).  
 37. E.g., Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 781–83; see also MARY F. RADFORD ET 
AL.,THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 992 (3d ed. 2008). 
 38. See Note, Trust Advisers, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1230 (1965). 
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article, and was not used to distinguish an advisor’s role from that of a pro-
tector’s.39 
Most commentators, on the other hand, note that an advisor’s role is 
characteristically limited to making investment decisions, and often shares a 
close resemblance to that of a trustee’s, whereas a protector’s role is broad-
er.40 For instance, The Law of Trusts and Trustees outlines these inherent 
differences: 
Many of the same considerations applicable to a special trustee and trust 
protector apply to an advisor. In some ways, a trust protector is a combi-
nation between a special trustee and a trust advisor, performing in an ad-




Furthermore, the drafters of the Uniform Trust Code (UTC) have distin-
guished the two roles according to their respective powers: 
“Advisers” have long been used for certain trustee functions, such as the 
power to direct investments or manage a closely-held business. “Trust 
protector,” a term largely associated with offshore trust practice, is more 
recent and usually connotes the grant of greater powers, sometimes in-
cluding the power to amend or terminate the trust. Subsection (c) ratifies 
the recent trend to grant third persons such broader powers.
42
 
Finally, the Restatement Third of Trusts corroborates both the recent trend 
of including trust protectors in domestic trusts and their usage in broader 
capacities than trust advisors.43 
  
 39. See id. For a discussion of the typical and atypical trust participants and the roles 
they play in trust administration, see Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 779–83. 
 40. E.g., Ruce, supra note 4, at 74; Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 781–83. See also 
RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN & MICHAEL T. FLANNERY, DECEDENTS’ ESTATES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 662 (2nd ed. 2011) (“The power to remove a trustee may be retained by the set-
tlor, given to a beneficiary under defined circumstances, or given to a new development–a 
trust protector.”) (internal citations omitted); Comment, Molly S. Magee, Who Is the Client? 
Who Has the Privilege?: The Attorney Client Privilege in Trust Relationships in Arkansas, 65 
ARK. L. REV. 637, 637 (2012) (“The trustee is presumably retained because of expertise in a 
particular area . . . .”). 
 41. GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 122 (3d 
ed. 2008). 
 42. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808 cmt. (Supp. 2006) (citations omitted).  
 43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 (2003); id. § 75 (2007). 
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D. Consensus Among the States 
1. In the Legislatures 
The respective approaches to trust protection taken among the states 
vary to some extent.44 Some states have made substantial revisions to their 
trust codes, while others, such as Arkansas, have found themselves strad-
dling the fence. 
States in the latter group recognize trust protectors only by implication 
through adoption of the UTC.45 Section 808 of the UTC gives settlors the 
option of appointing a trust protector to direct the modification or termina-
tion of a trust.46 The statute goes on to state that trust protectors are fiduciar-
ies, but only presumptively so.47 The trust instrument will still ultimately 
govern the existence and extent of a protector’s fiduciary and nonfiduciary 
duties. If the instrument fails to provide for such, however, the trust protec-
tor might be liable under the UTC for actions not taken in good faith, for the 
sole purposes of the trust or best interests of its beneficiaries.48 
For these reasons, UTC section 808 has acquired a well-known reputa-
tion for ineffectuality as it relates to trust protection. Many commentators 
assert that its drafters opened the door to impending liabilities for inade-
quately addressing the standard of care applicable to trust protectors by de-
fault.49 Further, many commentators disfavor the section because it neglects 
to specify the various powers a protector can exercise, and overlooks the 
implications of granting such powers.50 Mentioning protectors by name only 
  
 44. See generally Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 819–38. (distinguishing the respec-
tive statutes). 
 45. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 19-3B-808 (2006); ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-808 (Repl. 
2012). The Arkansas Trust Code (ATC) nearly mirrors the UTC in its entirety, and applies to 
all trusts created before, on, or after September 1, 2005. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-101 to -
1106 (Repl. 2012). With eleven exceptions, the terms of a trust still prevail over the default 
provisions enumerated in the code. Id. § 28-73-105 (Supp. 2009). For a comprehensive over-
view of the ATC, see Lynn Foster, The Arkansas Trust Code: Good Law for Arkansas, 27 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 191 (2005). 
 46. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 808(c) (2010). 
 47. Id. § 808(d). 
 48. The statute provides no further clarification of the trust protector’s powers or duties 
and mentions protectors by name only in commentary. See McLean v. Davis, 283 S.W.3d 
786, 789 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (addressing this discrepancy). 
 49. E.g., Sterk, supra note 7, at 2770 (asserting that fiduciary obligations of protectors 
remain somewhat unclear even in states that have already enacted detailed legislation). 
 50. E.g., Ausness, supra note 2, at 349–54 (noting that the UTC mentions only one type 
of power protectors typically exercise); see infra Part V. 
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in commentary has also fostered criticism of UTC section 808.51 Professor 
Ausness has urged the uniform drafting committee to readdress the section 
by enacting a separate black-letter section that expands upon the use of trust 
protectors.52  
To resolve these discrepancies, some UTC states have since enacted 
independent trust-protection legislation.53 The states most comprehensively 
recognizing the office of trust protector have enacted statutory provisions to 
aid practitioners with respect to the powers, duties, and liabilities attributa-
ble to a protector.54 For instance, most states in this group permit protectors 
to amend trust terms or to move or terminate a trust in response to unfore-
seeable changes in circumstances, such as new tax regulations or perpetuity 
laws, without petitioning a court.55 These states also provide that protectors 
can remove, replace, and appoint trustees.56 In some, a protector, when war-
ranted by the circumstances, can modify powers of appointment.57 Most 
importantly, a majority of these states explicitly define trust protectors as 
fiduciaries or nonfiduciaries by default; all observe the common notion that 
trust language overrides statutory language concerning trust protectors, 
though.58 
2. In the Courts  
As an issue of first impression, the Missouri Court of Appeals offered 
the only significant appellate discussion of trust protectors by a state court to 
  
 51. E.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends in American 
Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1877, 1916 (2000) (noting various challenges 
that drafters face in light of the widespread uncertainty with the use of protectors). 
 52. Ausness, supra note 2, at 349. 
 53. These states include Arizona, Michigan, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Vermont, and 
Wyoming. For each state’s respective legislation, see statutes cited infra note 54. 
 54. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370 (Repl. 2003); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10818 
(2008) (amended 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3313 (1986 & Supp. 2011); HAW. REV 
STAT. §§  554G-4, -4.5 (Supp. 2011); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-7-501 (1999 & Supp. 2007); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700-7103, -7809 (1998 & Supp. 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 
163.5547, -.5549, -.5553, -.5555 (LEXIS Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN §§ 564B:12-
1201 to -1206 (2006 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 18-9.2-2 (1999 & Supp. 2007); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 55-1B-1 (1997 & amended 2011), -6 (1997 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 35-16-108 (Supp. 2007), 35-15-303(7) (2004 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-
7-906 (West 2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, §§ 1101 to 1105 (Supp. 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 4-10-710 (Repl. 2003 & Supp. 2007). 
 55. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.5553(1)(a)–(b), (h) (Lexis-Nexis Supp. 2009). 
 56. E.g., id. § 163.5553(1)(e), (i). 
 57. E.g., id. § 163.5553(1)(d). See also Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 29, at 1331–35 
(discussing the modification of powers of appointment).  
 58. Compare MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7809(1)–(2), (8) (2010) (fiduciary presumption, 
subject to the terms of the trust), with ALASKA STAT. § 13.36.370 (2013) (nonfiduciary pre-
sumption, subject to the terms of the trust). 
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date in McLean v. Davis.59 Following the UTC,60 the court had to determine 
what standard of care to apply to a protector where the trust read, “The Trust 
Protector's authority hereunder is conferred in a fiduciary capacity and shall 
be so exercised, but the Trust Protector shall not be liable for any action 
taken in good faith.”61  
The court began its analysis by noting that the protector was a fiduciary 
according to terms of trust.62 It continued by discussing a variety of “reason-
able” interpretations that it could draw in determining whether the instru-
ment bound the protector to a particular standard of care.63 Although the 
court interpreted the statute as formally establishing the office of trust pro-
tector, it could not conclude that the statute conferred legal duties on protec-
tors in general.64 Consequently, the court reasoned that the beneficiaries 
could recover for the alleged breach based only on the instrument’s terms—
under principles of either contract or tort law.65  
The court inferred, however, that because the protector held qualified 
immunity only for a breach made in good faith, the settlor most likely con-
templated liability for a breach made in bad faith, regardless of whether the 
protector acted as a fiduciary.66 As such, it reversed the lower court’s order 
that held him not liable and remanded the case for determination outside of 
the adopted statute’s applicability.67 
The ruling did not establish an ultimate finding of liability under the 
UTC—fiduciary or otherwise. However, the court did determine that the 
protector had a general duty to act in good faith while in his capacity as pro-
tector.68 
  
 59. 283 S.W.3d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 60. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 456.1-101 to -1106 (2004). 
 61. McLean, 283 S.W.3d at 790.  
 62. Id. at 793.  
 63. Id. at 793–94.   
 64. See id. at 794–95 & n.3. 
 65. Id. at 793–94. 
 66. Id. at 795.  
 67. McLean, 283 S.W.3d. at 795. 
 68. Id. at 794. For further commentary on this case, see Ronald R. Volkmer, Court Ex-
amines the Status and Legal Liability of a Trust Protector, EST. PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 40 
(2009). Aside from determinations of American law, the federal courts have at times ad-
dressed and given affirmation to protectors with regard to offshore trusts. See, e.g., Shelden 
v. Trust Co. of Virgin Is., Ltd., 535 F. Supp. 667, 672 (D.P.R. 1982) (upholding the authority 
to remove trustee and appoint successor without petitioning the court where the instrument 
did not require such). 
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III. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS TO EMPLOYING A TRUST PROTECTOR 
A. Typical Concerns of Soon-To-Be Settlors 
The probability of improper management of trust assets exacerbates the 
longer the interests remain valid and the trust operational.69 Whether the 
trust is revocable or irrevocable, for purposes of healthcare, charity, spend-
thrift, or tax planning, contemplation of trust flexibility, to some extent, in-
evitably fills the mind of each settlor before executing a trust. 
The typical settlor would want to know how much control, if any, she 
could maintain over the trust. She would then consider the effect outside 
influences may have on the trust’s longevity, and through preparation, how 
she could successfully offset the potential harms resulting. Next, she would 
ask what, exactly, might assure her that the administration of her trust will 
not deviate from her instructions, or if unavoidable, that the administration 
will deviate in a manner she would have desired. She would also be con-
cerned with who, specifically, would be responsible for ensuring that her 
purpose in establishing the trust retains its full effect in the event she cannot 
act, or after her passing. 
B. Familiar Problems and Unfamiliar Solutions: Introducing Settlors to the 
Trust Protector 
1. Probing for a Remedy  
A favorable judicial interpretation of a trust’s language is frequently 
the most a settlor can hope for in terms of trust security. This can be a bur-
densome task for many judges and an unwanted departure from the plan for 
many settlors.70 In her absence, the settlor’s trust will remain operative; her 
trustee and beneficiaries will still have standing to petition a court for a 
modification of its terms.71 Even assuming the trust parties faithfully abide 
by the instrument’s instructions, factors outside the control of any party can 
equally work to frustrate the settlor’s intent. And bound by traditional com-
mon-law principles governing trustees and beneficiaries, the existing parties 
may be incapable or unwilling to modify the terms of the trust.72 
  
 69. The longer the duration of the trust, the more useful a protector can be. Ruce, supra 
note 4, at 69–70. 
 70. See infra Part IV. 
 71. Assuming the settlor is present, she may intervene only if she has reserved a right in 
herself sufficient to gain standing. First United Bank v. Phase II, 347 Ark. 879, 894, 69 
S.W.3d 33, 43 (2002).  
 72. See Bove, supra note 33, at 396–97.  
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Now consider the addition of a trust party bound not by traditional 
function, but instead by the distinct grants given by the settlor. Protection 
legislation provides a few, base standards for the use of trust protectors. 
However, it still lacks significant resemblance to trust principles guiding 
other trust offices, as protectors share a distinctive bond with settlors.73 A 
number of commentators have suggested it would be impracticable to gov-
ern trust protectors with traditional trust-law concepts.74 Hence, if the trust 
instrument unequivocally reflects what the protector is and is not authorized 
to do, a creative estate planner can formulate many ways to heighten securi-
ty and flexibility in trusts by using a trust protector.75 
2. Assessing the Costs  
Whether the use of a trust protector increases or decreases the average 
cost of operating a trust remains unclear.76 Some commentators suggest the 
benefits achieved by a protector may not outweigh the agency costs needed 
for their hire, which might leave some settlors disinterested.77 Causes cited 
for the appreciation of trust expenses include increased communication 
among trust parties, increased actions taken on their behalves, and increased 
compensation sometimes needed to employ protectors.78  
The other view is that, because protectors typically act intermittently, 
they can negate financial waste of trust assets over time without imposing 
unnecessary expenses on the corpus. This view acknowledges a protector’s 
ability to authorize, veto, or prevent certain actions taken by trustees and 
beneficiaries.79 
For example, vetoing a trustee’s discretionary conveyance of a power 
of appointment to a less-than-competent donee would safeguard trust assets, 
and incentivize the trustee to strive for future sustentation of the assets.80 
  
 73. See infra Part V. 
 74. E.g., Sterk, supra note 7, at 2762–63. See infra Part V. 
 75. See Duncan & Sarafa, supra note 5, at 783; Bove, supra note 33, at 390 (“[I]t is this 
nascent super flexibility, which seems to allow us to deal with almost every conceivable 
future circumstance (including the excusing of shortcomings in drafting), which makes this 
position of protector so increasingly popular.”); see also infra Part IV. 
 76. Alexander, supra note 3, at 2807–08. 
 77. E.g., Sterk, supra note 7. The decision to either use or not use trust protectors is an 
optional one that many have embraced and, of course, some have not. This proposal will not 
force settlors to do anything, though. Only the settlor and her estate planner can determine if 
the use of a protector would ultimately best suit her needs and those of her beneficiaries. 
 78. See id. at 2774–79. 
 79. E.g., Ausness, supra note 2. 
 80. See id. at 331; see also Sterk, supra note 7, at 2768 (noting that litigation costs can 
be avoided simply by requiring a trustee to gain the approval or consent of a protector before 
taking certain, specified actions). This category of donees may include, for example, irre-
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Also, the exercise of administrative authority, such as removing a trustee for 
fiduciary breach without engaging a lawsuit, can save the litigation expenses 
that would otherwise be necessary to do so.81 Finally, tactical modifications 
to trust procedures, such as moving the situs jurisdiction82 or amending the 
interests in the trust to gain financial advantages presented by changes in tax 
laws and regulations, can likewise add to a protector’s potential to maintain 
and even increase trust principal.83 
IV. ILLUSTRATION OF BENEFIT 
A. Alexander v. McEwen84 
Review of this case shows the need for nonjudicial alternatives to trust 
security and flexibility where interactions between trust participants impede 
the successful administration of the trust. The unfortunate results seen in this 
case are attributable to both fiduciary misconduct and judicial inaction.85 
1. The Disposition  
Anne McEwen, before passing, established the Anne Stodder McEwen 
Trust, which provided in part for any remaining balance in her Individual 
Retirement Account (IRA) to be paid on her death to her son, Fred McEwen, 
and her daughter, Kelsey McEwen.86 The trust directed a one-third share in 
the IRA balance to Fund E, “the Anne Stodder McEwen Trust for Frederick 
  
sponsible individuals, particularly elderly or young individuals, and individuals susceptible to 
undue influence. 
 81. Sterk, supra note 7, at 2773. Regardless of how the vacancy occurs, it will likely be 
more costly to the trust if a co-trustee or beneficiary has the authority to replace the trustee or 
appoint a successor. Ausness, supra note 2; see BOVE, supra note 25, at 212 (suggesting that 
beneficiaries lack objectivity and noting that the power to appoint successor trustees creates a 
taxable, beneficial interest); Foster, supra note 45, at 220 (noting the difficulties beneficiaries 
confront in agreeing on modifications of a trust, which would include appointing new trus-
tees, particularly where there are many or contingent beneficiaries); Ensing, supra note 22, at 
95–97 (discussing similar tax-related consequences on the estate of a settlor when she retains 
the right to appoint successor trustees). 
 82. “The location or position (of something) for legal purposes, as is lex situs, the law of 
the place where the thing in issue is situated.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (7th ed. 
1999). 
 83. In addition to the courts, the ATC gives trustees a limited ability to modify trust 
language to achieve a settlor’s tax objectives. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-416, -814  (Repl. 
2012). However, trustees must first inform all beneficiaries, including qualified beneficiaries, 
and evade objection in order to make a valid transfer to a different jurisdiction. Id. § 28-73-
108(d)–(e) (Repl. 2012). 
 84. 367 Ark. 241, 239 S.W.3d 519 (2006).  
 85. See id., 239 S.W.3d at 519.  
 86. Id. at 243, 239 S.W.3d at 521.  
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John McEwen,” and a two-thirds share to Fund F, for “Kelsey McEwen 
Alexander.”87 Some five years later, however, Ms. McEwen amended the 
trust by revoking both funds and establishing separate, independent trusts 
for her children under the same terms and titles.88  
Kelsey acted as trustee for both trusts, and it appears she acted as sole 
trustee.89 Fred suffered from a costly neuropathy condition that restricted 
him to the use of a wheelchair.90 When Ms. McEwen passed, Kelsey peti-
tioned the court, contending that Fred’s interest in the account “prede-
ceased” Ms. McEwen when her mother revoked the funds from the initial 
trust and resettled her IRA in a separate trust that was not directly payable to 
Fred.91  
According to Kelsey, she remained the sole beneficiary of the IRA pro-
ceeds.92 Fred contended that the separation had no bearing on his mother’s 
intent to devise each sibling’s IRA share in accordance with the initial 
trust.93 He also filed a counterclaim requesting that Kelsey be removed and 
replaced as trustee.94 
2. The Court’s Decision  
The circuit court rejected Kelsey’s claim, agreeing instead with Fred’s 
interpretation of the instruments.95 More pertinent to this discussion, howev-
er, it denied Fred’s request to remove Kelsey as trustee and awarded her 
$125,000 in legal fees.96 Unsatisfied, Kelsey appealed the IRA designation 
to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, to which Fred responded by cross-
appealing the remaining two issues.97 In particular, he directed the court’s 
attention to the following trust provision: “Any corporate trustee shall be 
entitled to reasonable fees commensurate with its duties and responsibilities 
. . . .”98 
On appeal, Kelsey again found no support for her interpretation of the 
IRA designation.99 The majority opinion deferred to the circuit judge’s wide 
discretion in removing trustees, dismissing Fred’s cross-appeal for failing to 
  
 87. Id. at 244–45, 239 S.W.3d at 525.  
 88. Id. at 243, 239 S.W.3d at 521.    
 89. Id., 239 S.W.3d at 521.  
 90. Alexander, 367 Ark. at 248, 239 S.W.3d at 525 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part).  
 91. Id. at 245, 239 S.W.3d at 522–23. . 
 92. Id., 239 S.W.3d at 522–23. 
 93. Id., 239 S.W.3d at 521.  
 94. Id. at 247–48, 239 S.W.3d at 524. 
 95. Id. at 243, 239 S.W.3d at 521. 
 96. Alexander, 367 Ark. at 243, 247, 239 S.W.3d at 521, 524 . 
 97. Id. at 243, 239 S.W.3d at 521.  
 98. Id. at 248 n.1, 239 S.W.3d at 525 n.1 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added).  
 99. Id. at 245–46, 239 S.W.3d at 522–24. 
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“develop his argument,” though the argument was properly preserved for 
appeal.100 The majority reached this conclusion despite Fred’s contentions 
that “Kelsey is biased, that there is a hostile relationship between him and 
Kelsey,” and that Kelsey refused to cooperate in “the division of personal 
property.”101 The record also reflected that Kelsey, while “acting as trustee, 
quit making Fred’s necessary health care payments.”102  
As for Kelsey’s legal fees, the court affirmed the authorizing order, but 
remanded the issue for further consideration as to what services Kelsey ac-
tually performed as trustee.103 
A trustee is entitled to reasonable compensation out of the trust estate for 
services as trustee, unless the terms of the trust provide otherwise or the 
trustee agrees to forgo compensation. Where a trust specifically states 
that a trustee is to serve without compensation, such a provision might be 
enforceable. No such provision is found in Anne’s trust.
104
 
3. The End Results  
Regrettably, the majority chose to exercise judicial minimalism in dis-
missing Fred’s cross-appeal to remove Kelsey as trustee. In fact, the majori-
ty itself stated that mutual hostility due to ill feelings could constitute 
grounds for removal.105 Under the Arkansas Trust Code (ATC), a court may 
remove a trustee for, among other grounds, a “serious breach of trust,” or, if 
“because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to 
administer the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the 
trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries.”106 
Because the majority chose not to indicate how Fred failed to develop 
his argument on the bases of bias, fiduciary breach, mutual hostility, and 
unfitness, we can only speculate as to those claims. Writing for the dissent, 
Justice Glaze elaborated to this end, further questioning Kelsey’s inappro-
priate hostility in refusing to share personal items and family memorabilia 
with Fred.107 By the close of the legal dispute, Kelsey herself was the only 
party involved that never at least acknowledged her inappropriate behavior 
as trustee.108 Yet, ironically, she still walked away in better condition than 
Fred, despite both courts rejecting her claim. 
  
 100. Id.at 247–48, 239 S.W.3d at 524–25. 
 101. Id. at 247–48, 239 S.W.3d at 524. 
 102. Alexander, 367 Ark. at 248, 239 S.W.3d at 525 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part). 
 103. Id. at 247, 239 S.W.3d at 524. 
 104. Id. at 247, 239 S.W.3d at 524 (citations omitted). 
 105. Id. at 248, 239 S.W.3d at 524.  
 106. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-706(b)(1), (3) (Repl. 2012).  
 107. Alexander, 367 Ark. at 249 n.2, 239 S.W.3d at 525 n.2 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part).  
 108. Id. at 243, 239 S.W.3d at 521. 
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No provision in the trust specifically stated that Kelsey was to serve as 
trustee without compensation—but this misses the point. The trust only spe-
cifically addressed providing compensation, not serving as trustee without 
compensation. As the dissent observed, “Anne’s trust specifically awards 
fees only to a corporate trustee, not an individual trustee.”109  
Kelsey was an individual trustee—not a corporate trustee.110 For this 
reason, the majority could have found that Kelsey was not entitled to fees 
because, irrespective of whether the trust specifically stated that she was to 
serve without compensation, it still provided otherwise for awarding all trus-
tee fees from the corpus.111 Nevertheless, because Ms. McEwen’s amend-
ment to the trust gave rise to a disputable ambiguity, Kelsey had adequate 
grounds to seek judicial interpretation of its terms and secured at least the 
right to recover up to $125,000 from Fred.112 
4. A Belated Resolution  
A protector with directive authority could have forced Kelsey to make 
Fred’s medical payments as instructed by the trust instrument.113 Further, 
Fred’s neuropathic affliction left him at a gross vulnerability in that he was 
in dire need of the payments.114 Coupled with Kelsey’s reluctance to cooper-
ate, his illness likely resulted in his practical inability to monitor her actions 
in administering the trust. To ensure that Fred remain well-informed of his 
rights as a beneficiary, a protector could have obligated Kelsey to account to 
Fred without requesting judicial intervention.115 
Moreover, if Fred had already incurred damages because of Kelsey’s 
inaction, a protector could have compensated him for his losses by adjusting 
  
 109. Id. at 248, 239 S.W.3d at 525 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part).  
 110. See id., 239 S.W.3d at 525.  
 111. See James v. Echols, 183 Ark. 826, 39 S.W.2d 290, 292 (1931) (“[T]he trustee ac-
cepts the trust and. . . he accepts the trust upon the conditions named in it and is entitled to no 
other or greater compensation than the will allows.”). 
 112. For a look at using protectors in trusts with IRAs, see James L. Boring, Protection of 
Inherited IRAs, 36 AM. C. TR. & EST. COUNS. L.J. 577, 607–09 (2010). 
 113. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2768–69. 
 114. See Alexander, 367 Ark. at 248, 239 S.W.3d at 525 (Glaze, J., dissenting in part). 
 115. According to Sterk, a protector “might be in a position to relieve the trust beneficiar-
ies of the primary responsibility for monitoring the trustee,” both protecting against conceal-
ment of information and foregoing the litigation costs of challenging a trustee in court. Sterk, 
supra note 7, at 2768; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-201 (2005). At the same time, a protec-
tor’s discretionary authority to unilaterally remove the trustee from office for noncompliance 
would further incentivize the trustee to adhere to his or her primary duty to report to the bene-
ficiary. See id. § 28-73-813 (2005). A settlor might require the trustee to account to the pro-
tector, or require the trustee to do so at the protector’s request. For more on the difficulties 
beneficiaries face in enforcing trusts, see Ruce, supra note 4, at 95. 
2013] TRUST PROTECTORS 1153 
his interests in the trust.116 Similarly, a protector could have gone around 
Kelsey and personally made the distributions when it became apparent that 
the siblings were at odds. As another option, the protector could have modi-
fied or amended the trust language in such a way to protect Fred against 
similar harm in the future.117 
Alternatively, a protector with the authority to interpret trust language 
could have bypassed the need for litigation by settling the dispute at the re-
quest of one of the parties.118 Not only would this have averted the litigation 
expenses, but it would have also more effectively honored Ms. McEwen’s 
purposes for the trust by keeping discretionary authority over the instrument 
outside of the courts. The presiding justices did not know Ms. McEwen; 
further, there was little indication of what may have influenced her to sepa-
rate the funds, or to use the term “corporate trustee” despite placing her 
daughter in office. 
To the contrary, someone who knew Ms. McEwen personally might 
well have been able to answer such questions.119 Like the court, a protector 
could have issued a legally valid ruling after examining all the evidence 
  
 116. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 331. As an aside, co-trustees are usually required to act 
by consensus, whereas a protector can make determinations as a single unit. See ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 28-73-703(a) (Repl. 2012) (allowing majority action). This further enhances flexibil-
ity by lessening the impact of unnecessary correspondence and refusals to compromise over 
trust operations. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2776; see also BOVE, supra note 25, at 212 (sug-
gesting that the authority to change trust interests or trust beneficiaries is best held by an 
independent party—i.e., not a settlor, trustee, or beneficiary). 
 117. Settlors occasionally vest this authority with trustees. However, partly because of the 
competing interests between settlor and beneficiary, trustees often refrain from making such 
modifications despite even clear indications that the settlor would have desired the modifica-
tion. Sterk, supra note 7, at 2767. 
 118. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 345. Courts typically give deference to a trustee’s 
discretion in providing for beneficiaries and are generally reluctant to declare that a trustee 
should operate or should have operated differently. See, e.g., Salem v. Lane Processing Trust, 
72 Ark. App. 340, 344, 37 S.W.3d 664, 667 (2001). A private-party determination by a pro-
tector would increase objectivity and fairness at the outset. PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 
2, at 253. Conversely, the potential for an abuse of discretion is greater where trustees are 
allowed to interpret trust language. Id. (“Thus seen, trustee discretion can be pretty close to a 
blank check, subject to little restraint or oversight.”). See also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-815 
to -816 (Repl. 2012) (providing trustees with considerable discretion). 
 119. See Tiernan, supra note 29, at 25–26 (claiming that family members and friends are 
logical choices to serve as protector, based on a presumption of personal knowledge of the 
circumstances and parties involved). For a family member or friend reluctant to take on legal 
duties—whether fiduciary or not—a settlor might consider proposing a right of disclaimer. 
For instance, “X, as Trust Protector under this Agreement, shall have the exercisable right, in 
writing and delivered to the trustee, to at any time disclaim, renounce, suspend, or decrease 
any powers, duties, or discretion granted him herein.” 
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before him; unlike the court, he could have followed his own discretion, 
including what Ms. McEwen told him.120 
In all likelihood, a protector would have removed Kelsey from of-
fice.121 Because she seemingly continued to frustrate her mother’s intent by 
disregarding the terms of the trust, she had no business continuing to serve 
as trustee. In turn, a protector could have appointed a replacement trustee 
who, in the protector’s judgment, Ms. McEwen would have so chosen to 
further the trust’s purposes.122 
B. Bank of America, N.A. v. Brown123 
Review of Bank of America, N.A. v. Brown illustrates the need for a 
nonjudicial means of trust security and flexibility where, despite an une-
quivocal showing of intent, minor technicalities in or omissions from a trust 
instrument can thwart the settlor’s purpose in establishing the trust. 
1. The Disposition  
On March 9, 1990, Roy Lyndell Sharpe properly executed both an inter 
vivos trust and a testamentary trust.124 Under both instruments, Sharpe 
named the Worthen Bank and Trust Company (“Worthen”) of Little Rock, 
Arkansas, as sole trustee.125 The court found the following directions appear-
ing in the testamentary trust to be equally applicable to the inter vivos trust: 
It is my intent that Worthen Bank and Trust Company, N.A., shall be the 
sole Trustee of this Trust, however, if because of any unforeseen event 
Worthen Bank and Trust Company, N.A., cannot administer this Trust 
from its Trust Department within the boundaries of the City of Little 
Rock, Arkansas, then my attorney, or in his absence any Court of compe-
  
 120. For Ms. McEwen, the employ of a professional protector might have also been de-
sirable in light of Kelsey’s fiduciary inexperience and the many conflicts of interest between 
her and her brother. While less knowledgeable of Ms. McEwen and her wishes, the employ 
of a professional (or corporate, institutional, etc.) protector can be particularly valuable where 
conflicts of interests exist. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 344. The circuit court suggested an 
independent corporate trustee divide the personal property. Alexander, 367 Ark. at 248, 239 
S.W.3d at 524. However, even had Ms. McEwen appointed a corporate trustee in the first 
place, the trustee would still face the difficulties mentioned supra notes 80, 81, 115–18, 
whereas a corporate protector would be more favorable for the same reasons a personal pro-
tector would be. See also infra notes 146–48. 
 121. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 330. See generally ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-706 
(Repl. 2012). 
 122. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 333–34. 
 123. 2011 Ark. 446,  2011 WL 5110201,.  
 124. Id. at 1–2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *1.  
 125. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *1.  
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tent jurisdiction, shall select the trust institution to continue to administer 
this Trust as Trustee.
126
 
The trusts named Charles A. Brown as the attorney responsible for ap-
pointing successor trustees.127 Through a series of mergers spanning from 
the early 1990s through 2009, Bank of America succeeded Worthen as trus-
tee.128 Bank of America sent Mr. Brown a notification stating that a team of 
its corporate trustees operating out of Dallas, Texas, would be taking over 
the administration of Sharpe’s trusts.129 Brown filed suit in Pulaski County 
Circuit Court to have Bank of America removed as trustee so that he could 
appoint a successor trustee within the boundaries of Little Rock, as instruct-
ed by Mr. Sharpe.130 
2. The Court’s Decision  
The circuit court granted Brown’s request and removed Bank of Amer-
ica from office.131 On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Arkansas re-
versed, holding that Brown lacked standing to bring the matter before the 
circuit court.132 The court found that Brown lacked standing for two reasons: 
one related to the specific rights given to him by Sharpe and the other to his 
status under the trusts.133 
According to the ATC, a settlor, cotrustee, or beneficiary of a trust may 
petition a court for the removal of a trustee from office.134 Because Brown 
was none of these, but instead Sharpe’s personal attorney, the court found 
that he lacked an actual “interest” in the trust that would give him standing 
to petition for Bank of America’s removal.135 The court stated, “[A] direc-
tion to employ a named lawyer as attorney for the trustee is ordinarily in-
tended merely to promote efficient administration of the trust rather than to 
confer a benefit on the lawyer.”136 
Brown then asserted that the ATC should not apply as both trusts were 
created prior to its enactment.137 Like the circuit court, the Supreme Court 
  
 126. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *2–3. 
 127. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *2.  
 128. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *2–3.  
 129. Bank of Am., 2011 Ark. 446, at 2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *3.  
 130. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *3.  
 131. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *3. 
 132. Id. at 4, 2011 WL 5110201, at *6. 
 133. Id. at 2–3, 2011 WL 5110201, at *4–5.  
 134. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-706 (Repl. 2012). 
 135. Bank of Am., 2011 Ark. at 2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *4.  
 136. Id. at 2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *4 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 48 
cmt. B, at 237 (2003)). 
 137. Id. at 3, 2011 WL 5110201, at *4–5(citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-105 (Repl. 
2012), which provides the authority to remove trustees and appoint their successors). 
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agreed that both trusts authorized Brown to appoint successor trustees.138 
Even so, it reasoned, he lacked standing to enforce that authority because 
neither instrument provided a means of personally removing Worthen from 
office, irrespective of the ATC’s applicability.139 
3. The End Results  
Under Sharpe’s trusts, Brown had authority to appoint a successor trus-
tee if Worthen either ceased serving as trustee altogether or ceased serving 
as trustee within the city of Little Rock.140 Worthen ceased serving in both 
regards.141 As the circuit court presumably did, the Supreme Court could 
have interpreted the trusts as implicitly acknowledging that Worthen’s re-
moval would be required in order for Brown to appoint a successor. 
Yet, the lack of an expressly granted removal authority in the trusts 
created a situation where the court could justifiably deny Brown standing in 
accordance with ATC section 28-73-706. This author believes the court 
could have—and indeed, should have—deferred to the circuit court and held 
to the contrary.142 However, more important to this analysis, Sharpe’s pur-
poses for the ultimate disposition of his property were not given effect.143 
4. A Belated Resolution  
Simple enough, a protector could have removed Bank of America from 
office when Worthen breached the agreement.144 Next, the protector could 
have appointed a successor trustee capable of, and willing to, administer the 
  
 138. Id. at 3, 2011 WL 5110201, at *5.  
 139. Id., 2011 WL 5110201, at *5–6. But cf. United States v. Mount Vernon Mortg. 
Corp., 128 F. Supp. 629 (D.D.C. 1954) aff'd sub nom. Mount Vernon Mortgage Corp. v. 
United States, 236 F.2d 724 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (holding that co-trustees renounced their posi-
tions by transferring trust property against the terms of the trust, whereby the appointment of 
successor trustees was necessary). 
 140. See Bank of Am., 2011 Ark. at 1, 2011 WL 5110201, at *2. 
 141. See id. at 2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *3.  
 142. See In re Smart's Trust, 181 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (allowing the ap-
pointment of an out-of-state trustee only because the settlor had not specifically confined trust 
operations to the state of New York and the trust allowed the appointment of any successor 
trustee). See generally GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND 
TRUSTEES § 527 nn. 39–45 (discussing numerous cases that support the removal of trustees 
for general disobedience to trust terms). 
 143. The ruling seemed to sanction a trustee’s ability to disregard the terms of a trust 
without proving it acted for the sole purposes of the trust and in the best interests of the bene-
ficiaries. Here, any mention of Brown in either instrument was essentially inconsequential. 
 144. See O’BRIEN & FLANNERY, supra note 40, at 662. 
2013] TRUST PROTECTORS 1157 
trusts in Little Rock.145 If the trusts could no longer serve Sharpe’s purposes, 
the protector could have exercised a power of termination and distributed 
the assets in a manner that Sharpe would have.146 Through these measures, 
no parties involved would be required to appear before a court.147 
V. A FORECAST OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
The value of using trust protectors inevitably hinges on whether they 
are declared fiduciaries.148 This determination is paramount because it sig-
nals the fiduciary obligations that give rise to enforceable interests.149 When 
drafting a trust, a settlor can, and always should, designate whether her trust 
protector holds any powers in a fiduciary capacity. Even still, the existence 
of a fiduciary relationship is a question of law,150 and one that remains unan-
swered with regard to trust protectors.151 
A. Initial Implications Based on Bank of America v. Brown  
1. Questions Answered 
Let us say Mr. Sharpe had given the power to “Charles A. Brown, as 
my Trust Protector,” rather than to “Charles A. Brown, as my Attorney,” but 
still omitted removal authority and otherwise used the exact same language 
appearing in both instruments. The court would presumably consider the 
  
 145. See BOVE, supra note 25, at 234. Protectors should have the ability to appoint their 
own successors as well, provided the successor is not within the meaning of a related or sub-
ordinate party to the grantor under I.R.C. § 672(c). A settlor could also restrict certain indi-
viduals from ever serving as a protector to the trust. In the event of an unexpected vacancy, 
trustees should be able, temporarily, to assume the protector’s duties. In such a case, a suc-
cessor protector could be appointed by the trustee with the consent of a majority of the bene-
ficiaries.  
 146. See Ausness, supra note 2, at 331–32. In Arkansas, terminating a failing trust can be 
burdensome, troublesome, and in some instances unmanageable altogether. The requirements 
include, for example, gaining unanimous consent among beneficiaries and qualified benefi-
ciaries, if any exist. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-110(a), -410 to -414 (Repl. 2012). See 
also Foster, supra note 45, at 220–27 (discussing various options for terminating a trust in 
Arkansas). As an aside, a settlor could always give her protector an elective power to change 
the situs jurisdiction of the trust. 
 147. Whether vacancy stems from removal or resignation, courts can potentially to take 
control over some or all of the trust’s operations by default if the matter cannot be resolved 
without filing judicial petition. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-704(e), -705, -706 (Repl. 
2012). 
 148. See infra Part V.C–E.  
 149. See Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185–86, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002). 
 150. Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 520, 922 S.W.2d 692, 698 (1996). 
 151. See infra Part V.E. 
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“ordinary functions” assumed by trust protectors, as it did in Bank of Ameri-
ca with attorneys, before granting or denying Brown standing.152 
In doing so, it would discover that the most widely recognized uses for 
a trust protector are directing or modifying the actions of trustees, and re-
moving, replacing, and appointing trustees.153 As such, Sharpe’s purpose in 
establishing the trusts would not likely fail simply due to the omission of a 
protector’s generally expected power to remove trustees, and Bank of Amer-
ica would likely lose its suit against Brown seeking reinstatement.154 
2. Questions Not Answered 
If Sharpe had given Brown the authority to remove Worthen from of-
fice, the dispute would never have arisen. The result would probably be no 
different if the instrument labeled Brown as a trust protector instead of an 
attorney. But the issue is not so simple, and the answer does not resolve the 
ultimate issue. True, Brown would have standing to enforce the trusts; how-
ever, unanticipated problems would arise, none of which would allow the 
court to rely on current ATC provisions for a solution.155  
B. The Fiduciary Relationship  
To impose a legal duty, one must owe a duty to another.156 A fiduciary 
relationship generally exists where one individual has a duty, expressly or 
impliedly, to subordinate himself and his actions to serving the best interests 
  
 152. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Brown, 2011 Ark. 446, at 2, 2011 WL 5110201, at *5. 
 153. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 73–74. 
 154. If a settlor wishes to limit the protector to appointing, as opposed to removing and 
replacing, trustees, consider qualifying the extent of the protector’s authority to vacancies. Of 
course, the protector’s discretion to remove and replace trustees can be refined to any stand-
ard: “X, as Trust Protector, shall have the power to appoint as a successor Trustee or Protec-
tor only an individual (or institution) meeting all qualifications for the respective office to be 
filled as set forth in this Agreement.”  
 155. See infra Part V.B. Indeed, “[W]e as legal advisers and drafters must not be vague 
about it or ignorant of the ramifications of the [trust protector] position, as that is often what 
has proved to be the real source of the problems.” BOVE, supra note 25, at 234. 
 156. Long v. Lampton, 324 Ark. 511, 520, 922 S.W.2d 692, 698 (1996). 
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of another, which must precede a finding of fiduciary breach.157 The party 
claiming the relationship holds the burden of proving its existence.158 
Once a fiduciary relationship is established, a party can prove a fiduci-
ary breach by showing a “betrayal of a trust and benefit [of a] dominant 
party at the expense of [a party subject to] his influence.”159 The breaching 
party is liable “to the other for harm resulting from a breach of the duty im-
posed [on him] by the relationship.”160 
That duty only arises where the subordinate party contemplated the ac-
tion or inaction as being within the scope of the fiduciary relationship.161 
Laws governing fiduciary relationships are related to principal-agent rela-
tionships.162 Based on this undertaking, the agent owes a duty to the princi-
pal to conform to a standard of care greater than ordinary contract law 
would impose on him,163 and not all agreements between individuals give 
rise to fiduciary obligations simply because they appear contractual in na-
ture.164 The law provides different standards of care based on the unique 
circumstances of the relationship.165 
C. Assessing the Fiduciary Duties of the Trust Protector 
Barring the terms of a trust, the nature of a trust protector’s powers will 
generally determine whether he held office in a fiduciary capacity.166 If the 
protector could exercise or not exercise his powers without consideration of 
the settlor’s intent or purposes for the trust, his powers would most likely be 
personal—i.e., nonfiduciary.167 As a personal power is not enforceable 
  
 157. Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002); see also Knox v. Re-
gions Bank, 103 Ark. App. 99, 105, 286 S.W.3d 737, 741 (2008) (stating that Arkansas 
courts look to the “factual underpinnings” of each case). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
defines a fiduciary more narrowly than do the Arkansas courts, more reluctant to impose 
fiduciary duties outside of the trustee context. E.g., Hunter v. Philpott, 373 F.3d 873, 876 (8th 
Cir. 2004). 
 158. See Country Corner Food and Drug v. First State Bank and Trust Co., 332 Ark. 645, 
654, 966 S.W.2d 894, 898 (1998). 
 159. Cole, 349 Ark. at 185–86, 76 S.W.3d at 883. 
 160. Long, 324 Ark. at 518, 922 S.W.2d at 696–97 (1996). 
 161. See id. at 517–19, 922 S.W.2d at 696–98.  
 162. Carpenter v. Layne, 2010 Ark. App. 364, at 10, 374 S.W.3d  871, 877. 
 163. Evans Indus. Coatings, Inc. v. Ch. Ct. of Union Cnty., 315 Ark. 728, 733–34, 870 
S.W.2d 701, 703 (1994). 
 164. See Dent v. Wright, 322 Ark. 256, 261, 909 S.W.2d 302, 304–05 (1995); Evans, 315 
Ark. at 733–34, 870 S.W.2d at 703–04. 
 165. See Carpenter, 2010 Ark. App. 364, at 10, 374 S.W.3d 871, 877. 
 166. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–82. 
 167. See id. 
1160 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35  
against its holder, the protector would presumably owe no legal duty other 
than to exercise or not exercise the powers in a nonfraudulent way.168 
On the other hand, if it appeared that the trust protector’s powers were 
given to carry out an important trust objective, benefit an adverse party, or 
serve the best interests of the beneficiaries, the powers would most likely be 
fiduciary in nature.169 As such, the protector may be held to a higher stand-
ard of care, such as that required of trustees, in which case the protector 
must comply with the standards of fair dealing, good faith, honesty, and 
loyalty in protecting the best interests of the beneficiaries.170 Yet, in most 
instances, this standard of care would be inappropriate for trust protectors.171 
D. Ascertaining the Trust Protector’s “Principal” 
It may be impracticable to declare a principal-agent standard that labels 
the principals, whether they are the settlors or the beneficiaries, in all trust 
protector relationships by default.172 Many settlors expect the latter, others 
the former.173 
While the protector may indeed be a fiduciary, the settlor appointed 
him to function as a trust protector—not as a trustee. To date, there has been 
a noticeable tendency to equate the trust protector with a trustee, which in 
certain cases is understandable.174 However, in many instances this can seri-
ously undermine basic principles of the principal-agent relationship, and 
unnecessarily take away from a trust protector’s worth.175 The settlor’s intent 
for employing a protector must dictate the capacity in which the protector 
acts; otherwise, diffusion in responsibility may occur.176 
Trustees, unlike trust protectors, own legal title to trust assets subject to 
an equitable obligation to invest, maintain, and distribute those assets for the 
  
 168. See id. Along with a clause restricting a protector from using his powers for his own 
benefit, a trust should also restrict a protector’s ability to use his powers for the benefit, be it 
direct or indirect, of a related or subordinate party as defined in I.R.C. § 672(c) (1998). 
 169. See id. 
 170. Hardy v. Hardy, 222 Ark. 932, 940–41, 263 S.W.2d 690, 695 (1954). 
 171. Sterk, supra note 7, at 2785 (“To induce protectors to function as settlors intend 
them to function—as monitors of trustee behavior—trust law must devise and apply a more 
deferential standard of review than that applied to trustees.”); see supra Part V.B. 
 172. Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–82. 
 173. Indeed, “one size won’t fit all, which is one of the reasons why it will be so difficult 
for courts to figure out just what the fiduciary rules should be with respect to trust protec-
tors.” Alexander, supra note 3, at 2811.  
 174. See generally Kiziah & Campbell, supra note 34, at 228 (noting a jurisdictional lack 
of uniformity). 
 175. See Busby v. Worthen Bank & Trust Co., 484 F. Supp. 647, 652 (E.D. Ark. 1979) 
(explaining that a trustee is “subject to what is probably the highest standard of fiduciary duty 
known to the law”).  
 176. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2781. 
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benefit of the trust’s beneficiaries.177 They necessarily contemplate and un-
dertake this duty to put the interests of the beneficiaries before their own.178 
Aside from directing trust investments, trust protectors mainly function in a 
different capacity toward the other trust parties179—hence, the trust protector 
is not a cotrustee. Where it may be appropriate to hold a trustee to its tradi-
tionally high standard of care in prudently managing trust investments,180 it 
might not be appropriate to require that same standard of a protector in exer-
cising a qualified—albeit fiduciary—power to remove a trustee.181 
From its inception, settlors have primarily engaged the trust protector’s 
office to serve their own interests.182 Settlors created the position for purpos-
es of asset protection, which probably remains the most popular way to use 
them to date.183 The emerging trend in employing protectors, moreover, is to 
gain tax benefits for settlors of long-term trusts.184 Although useful to bene-
ficiaries as well, the very nature of a trust protector’s powers indicates that 
most protectors contemplate owing duties, if any, to the settlors as opposed 
to the beneficiaries.185 The trust protector’s principal cannot be said in all 
cases to be either the settlor or a beneficiary, but the short history of this 
trust party lends favor to the settlor.186 
To illustrate a misalignment of intentions, imagine a settlor does not 
wish for her protector to owe any duties to her beneficiaries. Yet, she fails to 
include language in her trust that reflected that mutual understanding. With-
out interacting with, or perhaps even knowing of, the trust’s beneficiaries, 
the trust protector will probably be liable to the beneficiaries for his actions 
under current Arkansas law if functioning in a fiduciary capacity.187 
Indeed, a trust protector will be of little value to a trust settlor if the 
law, even by default, intrudes upon the mutual agreement made between 
settlor and protector. If amended, the law could still ensure that a trust re-
mains profitable for its beneficiaries, and at the same time, accomplish its 
purpose of exempting individuals from personal liability where no duty was 
  
 177. See Halliburton Co. v. E.H. Owen Family Trust, 28 Ark. App. 314, 319, 773 S.W.2d 
453, 456 (1989). 
 178. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-802(a) (Repl. 2012) (“A trustee shall administer the 
trust solely in the interests of the beneficiaries.”). 
 179. See supra Part II.C. 
 180. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-804 (Repl. 2012). 
 181. See infra Part V.C. 
 182. See supra Part II.B; see also Sterk, supra note 7, at 2763 (“As the living embodi-
ment of the dead settlor, the protector has the potential to mitigate the foresight problems 
associated with dead hand control.”). 
 183. Alexander, supra note 3, at 2807 (citing Sterk, supra note 7, at 2764). 
 184. See supra Part II.B. 
 185. See infra Part VI, app. subsec. (c). 
 186. See supra Part II; Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–82.  
 187. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-808(d) (Repl. 2012). 
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undertaken.188 It just needs to favor a balance between a settlor’s interest in 
managing her own affairs and a beneficiary’s interest in ensuring the inter-
nal stability of the trust.189 At present, depending on the type of power at 
issue and the applicable standard of care, a trust protector can potentially 
owe “duties” to the trust’s settlor, beneficiary, trustee, and perhaps to the 
trust itself. 
E. Applying the Duties of the Trust Protector Under Current Law 
What standard of care will the law require of trust protectors? The set-
tlor’s intent should be the dispositive factor in answering this question,190 
and interrelated factors are often necessary to decipher that intent. Trust 
instruments should describe in detail the standards applicable to a protector. 
Aside from trust language, the most conspicuous answer would originate 
from the type of power at issue.191 However, the better question to ask is 
how the protector can exercise the power he has, as opposed to what type of 
power the protector has to exercise, to account for the settlor’s intent. 
Potentially, a trust protector could be held to a fiduciary standard with 
respect to some of his duties and powers, while held to a different standard 
with respect to others.192 The extent of his liability would be even more un-
clear.193 It would of course depend on the particular standard of care applied, 
but the protector could be removed from his office, face liability for mone-
tary damages to a trust resulting from his breach of a duty, or perhaps even 
civil liability in tort to some, or all, of the other trust parties.194 Conversely, 
the protector could possibly forego all liability. 
Example: Settlor grants her protector the power to remove her trustee 
for “clear divergence from trust directions,” or “verified evidence of self-
dealing.” 
  
 188. See infra Part VI, app. subsec. (a). 
 189. See infra Part VI, app. subsec. (a)(2). 
 190. See Bailey v. Delta Trust & Bank, 359 Ark. 424, 432, 198 S.W.3d 506, 512–13 
(2004) (“The cardinal rule in construing a trust instrument is that the intention of the settlor 
must be ascertained.”). 
 191. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2782. 
 192. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–82. For instance, the same trust protector might hold 
both personal and fiduciary powers over the trust. But, the misuse of a purely personal power 
would not warrant fiduciary liability on the mere grounds that the protector held fiduciary 
powers. A breach of a fiduciary power, on the other hand, would lend a different result. See 
id. at 84.  
 193. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 cmt. a (2003) (“It is a question of interpreta-
tion whether and to what extent the person to whom the power is granted is subject to fiduci-
ary duties in exercising it.”). 
 194. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–92. 
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This settlor unlikely expects her protector to share in the trust’s finan-
cial, operational, and managerial responsibilities.195 Indeed, she appointed 
her trustee to serve those functions, based on her trustee’s qualifications.196 
Rather, the protector is restricted from exercising his power to specific crite-
rion, and essentially acting as a “defender” against the prospect of some 
future impropriety. 
Because the power appears exercisable only for the benefit of adverse 
parties, it will most likely constitute a fiduciary power.197 As such, the pro-
tector would presumably be held to the duty of good faith in exercising, or 
in failing to exercise, that particular power.198 
Example: Settlor grants her protector the authority to “at any time and 
from time to time, remove any trustee under this trust agreement.” 
Here, this trustee will remain employed for as long as the trust protec-
tor says and no longer. The trustee will be acutely aware of this, potentially 
allowing a substitution in professional discretion from time to time. Alt-
hough personal and exercisable at the protector’s election, this protector’s 
control, be it express or implied, over the financial success or failure of the 
trust in its entirety, would indicate the settlor’s contemplation of a more 
significant relationship of trust between her and her protector. This might be 
an instance where, despite trust language to the contrary, the protector might 
be held liable for bad faith, gross negligence, or willful indifference to the 
interests of others.199 However, it would be a discretionary decision for the 
circuit judge to make.200 
Example: Settlor grants her protector the authority to appoint successor 
trustees and fill vacancies in the office of trustee as they may arise from 
time to time. 
This protector, like Mr. Brown in Bank of America, has no discretion to 
remove any trustee from office, but unqualified discretion to appoint succes-
sors.201 Yet, in Bank of America, the court found Brown to be an “incidental 
beneficiary” as the trust’s attorney, and thus denied him standing.202 Perhaps 
this suggests that the power to appoint successors is essentially unenforcea-
ble without an accompanying power to remove—absent the trustee, on its 
own accord, delegating something it does not rightfully have to the true 
power holder. 
  
 195. See id. at 94–95. 
 196. See id. 
 197. See Hosey v. Burgess, 319 Ark. 183, 191, 890 S.W.2d 262, 266 (1995) (indicating 
that a mere coincidental benefit is not by itself sufficient for a finding of fiduciary breach). 
 198. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2783–804. 
 199. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 64 cmt. c (2003). 
 200. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 92–94. 
 201. 2011 Ark. 446, at 1, 2011 WL 5110201, at *2. 
 202. Id. at 2–3, 2011 WL 5110201, at *4–5. 
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Nevertheless, this is a personal power that the protector can exercise or 
not exercise at his sole election. Barring fraud, it would be unenforceable 
against him. 
Example: Settlor of a support trust appoints a protector and, along with 
the power to advise her trustee at the trustee’s request, grants her protector 
“the right to terminate the trust if thought necessary for the well-being of my 
son.” Indeed, this protector has substantial authority over the trust and live-
lihood of its beneficiary. But the power is in the form of a beneficial inter-
est. The protector would be the holder of a power of appointment and there-
fore not a fiduciary to the extent not provided otherwise by the trust.203 
Example: Settlor grants same power as in the previous example, but 
modified the availability of terminating the trust to where the protector has 
“knowledge, based on reliable evidence, that my son has used, smoked, or 
ingested illegal drugs.” This settlor does not expect her protector to manage 
the trust or to assume any typical trustee functions. In fact, she has qualified 
the protector’s capacity to the extent that no action can be taken unless or 
until the occurrence of one specified event—to which there will be one, spe-
cific result. 
True, she could have given this responsibility to her trustee if she so 
desired. But perhaps her trustee was a highly successful financial investor 
living outside the city, and maybe she felt that her niece, who lived down 
the street and shared social circles with her son, could more effectively ac-
complish this particular goal. The protector, however, did undertake the duty 
to watch over the beneficiary, and the ATC would presumably consider her 
a fiduciary and subject to the standard of good faith toward the trust and its 
beneficiaries.204 
F. Effect of Exculpation Clauses on the Trust Protector  
Can a trust protector be released from all liability to a trust party if the 
settlor simply provides an exculpation clause205 in the trust to that effect? Or, 
perhaps by deeming the protector’s powers personal rather than fiduciary? 
The ATC does not address the issue.206 Thus, such a clause would presuma-
bly be valid under statutory law.207 
  
 203. See I.R.C. § 2041 (2011). 
 204. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 2811; see also Ausness, supra note 2, at 346 (dis-
cussing the common ambiguities and broad language that often appear in support trusts). 
 205. “A contractual provision relieving a party from any liability resulting from a negli-
gent or wrongful act.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (9th ed. 1999). 
 206. However, the ATC does allow settlors to use exculpatory clauses with trustees. ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 28-73-1008 (Repl. 2012). For trustees, an exculpation clause is valid to the 
extent that it does not release a trustee from liability for acts taken in bad faith or with reck-
less indifference to others. Id. § 28-73-1008(a)(1). Furthermore, the relieving term is not 
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas, however, would disagree208—
assuming the court does not find it a matter of public policy preempted by 
the legislature. The court has routinely held that, regardless of the terms in a 
trust agreement, a fiduciary must always adhere to a standard of good faith 
and fair dealing.209 Since this is already the base standard, presumptively, for 
trust protectors, it seems a formal exculpation clause relieving a protector 
from liability would be unnecessary. 
That is, a nonfiduciary protector already has immunity from personal 
liability.210 If a fiduciary protector cannot be exculpated to a lesser standard 
of care than that already imposed, a clause providing otherwise would serve 
no purpose other than to qualify a protector’s powers as personal, rather than 
fiduciary.211 As previously mentioned, the settlor and protector must first be 
well aware of the adverse tax consequences this can have on the trust and 
their estates.212 
G. A Brief Look at the Interplay Between Trustee and Trust Protector  
If a trustee acts in good faith, yet its compliance with a nonfiduciary 
trust protector’s direction results in a material breach of trust, which party 
would bear the liability?213 
Example: Settlor grants her trust protector the authority to direct trust 
investments and distributions. Further, settlor requires her trustee to comply 
with the protector’s directions. The trust states that any rights, duties, pow-
ers, or obligations of the trust protector shall be held only in nonfiduciary 
capacities. At the protector’s direction, the trustee makes a poor investment 
that results in a breach of what would typically be a protector’s fiduciary 
power. 
If the direction was not manifestly against the terms of the trust,214 and 
the trustee could not have foreseen a breach of the protector’s fiduciary du-
  
enforceable if inserted as a result of an abuse of trust between the trustee and settlor. Id. § 28-
73-1008(a)(2). 
 207. One commentator notes that, “The extent to which the language of the trust may 
trump or modify the fiduciary duties of the trust protector is an important question that will 
be debated as the role of the trust protector plays out in the future.” Volkmer, supra note 68, 
at 41. 
 208. See Cole v. Laws, 349 Ark. 177, 185, 76 S.W.3d 878, 883 (2002). 
 209. E.g., id. 
 210. See Ruce, supra note 4, at 80–82. 
 211. A trust should excuse successor trustees and protectors from any liability associated 
with the acts of predecessors. 
 212. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 213. If compelling a protector’s consent, a trust should provide a timeframe in which the 
trustee is restricted from acting, such as twenty or thirty days, after which the trustee can act 
unabatedly. 
 214. ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-808 (Repl. 2012). 
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ties occurring, the trustee would not be liable.215 As the protector would 
qualify as a person with the power to direct the actions of a trustee, he 
would presumptively be a fiduciary according to the ATC.216 However, the 
trust explicitly stated that he held his authority in a nonfiduciary capacity, 
which would mean his powers were personal and therefore not enforceable 
against him. This may represent one circumstance in which a trust could 
potentially bear no responsibility to its beneficiaries under current state law. 
Example: Same facts as in the previous example, except the trust ex-
pected the trustee and protector to reach a mutual agreement before the trus-
tee could make any significant deviation in investment strategies. Further, it 
only provided the protector with the authority to consent to, approve, or veto 
the trustee’s proposals. The trust, moreover, failed to specify the standard of 
care applicable to the protector. After considering a new plan, the two come 
to a mutual agreement that results in a fiduciary breach. The beneficiaries 
sue them both. 
Unlike a power to direct,217 neither the UTC nor the ATC provides that 
a person with a power to consent to, approve, or veto a modification is pre-
sumptively a fiduciary. The commentary to UTC section 808 distinguishes a 
power to direct and a power to veto.218 The protector’s consent power does 
not give him the authority to make the trustee do anything. Only if the pro-
tector had power to impose on the trustee a duty to gain his consent before 
acting would the protector be exercising directive authority. Thus, it might 
be fair to say that, under the ATC, a person with the power to consent to or 
approve a trust modification is presumptively not a fiduciary charged with 
fiduciary duties—in which case the trustee might bear all liability for the 
breach, regardless of the protector’s involvement or influence.219 
  
 215. Id. § 28-73-1006. 
 216. Id. § 28-73-808(d). 
 217. Id. 
 218. See UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 808 cmt (2012). 
 219. Difficulty obtaining a protector’s consent can be especially problematic where the 
trust contains a spendthrift provision in favor of a beneficiary. If the trustee fails to make a 
distribution within a “reasonable” amount of time, a creditor of the beneficiary can garnish 
the assets from the beneficiary’s bankruptcy estate. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-502, -506 
(Repl. 2012); see also Wetzel v. Regions Bank (In re Reagan), 433 B.R. 263, 267 (W.D. Ark. 
2010) (showing that Arkansas courts have not defined “reasonable time”), aff’d sub nom. 
Wetzel v. Regions Bank, 649 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 2011). Moreover, beneficiaries cannot com-
pel the distribution themselves. Cotham v. First Nat’l Bank of Hot Springs, 287 Ark. 167, 
172–73, 697 S.W.2d 101, 104 (1985). 
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H. Compensation of the Trust Protector  
With all these potential liabilities, a trust protector might be entitled to 
compensation for his services if the instrument provides for such.220 If the 
instrument were silent regarding compensation, a protector could only re-
ceive compensation if he held the office as a fiduciary.221 The ATC only 
ensures adequate compensation and reimbursement of expenses for trus-
tees.222 It does not provide such assurances for trust protectors, nor does it 
contemplate compensation for a fiduciary outside the context of a trustee in 
general.223 
I. The End Result 
Thus, the ultimate question arises: would it be prudent for an individual 
to accept a protectorship under the current, uncertain conditions of the of-
fice’s role in Arkansas?224 
VI. CLARIFICATION & CONCLUSION 
An estate planner practicing in Arkansas need not yet assume he or she 
can draft away all rights, duties, and liabilities of trust protectors and those 
acting in concert with protectors. This developing area of trust law is un-
questionably still in its infancy. 
The vast urgency that settlors and their estate planners alike have in us-
ing the trust protector is evident and understandable: the office of trust pro-
tector embodies an unprecedented conception of trust flexibility. With its 
youth, however, comes unpredictability. What began as a localized phenom-
enon among a few particular states has become a common trend across the 
nation. State legislation will continue to develop the role of the trust protec-
tor in American trust law to reflect the endeavors of practitioners and the 
needs of their clients. 
  
 220. See BOVE, supra note 25, at 222. Also, a settlor might consider indemnifying a pro-
tector for the costs associated with defending against a claim for breach where a court finds 
that the protector’s conduct does not amount to gross negligence or willful misconduct. 
 221. See id. at 227–29.  
 222. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 28-73-708, -709 (Repl. 2012). 
 223. For a settlor reluctant to compensate an additional trust officer, limiting compensa-
tion to reimbursement for personal expenses may be worth considering, particularly when 
appointing a family member or friend. Alternatively, a settlor might consider employing a 
protector through the payment of a retainer fee. 
 224. At least to date, legal scholarship has not indicated that attorneys commonly serve as 
protectors. However, for attorneys who are serving, or who have an interest in doing so, one 
commentator advises they verify that their liability policies cover such services. BOVE, supra 
note 25, at 221–22. 
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Estate planners have already been—and will likely continue—
appointing protectors in Arkansas trust instruments.225 Amending section 28-
73-808 of the ATC would signify Arkansas’s participation with other states 
in one of trust law’s most pressing developments today. In doing so, the 
default roles, duties, and liabilities of trust parties provided by the legislation 
will give more certainty to estate planners in making predictions while draft-
ing their clients’ trust agreements.226  
For the time being, the legislature can assume that it has ratified the of-
fice of trust protector into Arkansas trust law. Naturally, it can further as-
sume that settlors and estate planners will, as best they can, react according-
ly. 
J. Andy Marshall∗ 
APPENDIX 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-808. Trust Protection—Powers, Duties, 
and Liabilities of Trust Participants.227 
A trust instrument may provide for the appointment of a trust protector. 
For purposes of this section, a person designated with a title or label 
whose powers are similar to those specified in subsection (c) is a trust 
protector, except to the extent otherwise provided in the trust instrument. 
  
 225. Other states following the UTC have also noted the use of protectors in their juris-
dictions. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36C-8-808 N.C. cmt. (West 2005) (amended 2012) 
(“Subsections (b), (c) and (d) introduce a concept of the trust protector or advisor that has not 
been addressed by statute in prior North Carolina law but was being used by practitioners in 
drafting trust instruments.”); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 18-B, § 105 Me. cmt. (requiring protectors 
to act in good faith toward beneficiaries by keeping them well informed); Mclean v. Davis, 
283 S.W.3d 786, 795 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 226. The legislature might consider this note’s proposed statute, appended infra. For its 
own analysis, it might look to the protection legislation already enacted in other jurisdictions. 
See statutes cited supra note 54. And for guidance on how the legislation could be incorpo-
rated within the ATC, see 2008 NH Laws 374 (codified as N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 564-
B:12-1201 to -1206 (LexisNexis 2008) (specifying the most relevant codified section of the 
session law pertaining to trust protectors and trust advisors)). 
 ∗ J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock William H. Bowen School of Law, 2013; 
B.A. in Criminal Justice, University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 2009. I would like to offer 
my deepest gratitude to Professor Michael T. Flannery for recommending this topic and for 
his guidance and encouragement during the initial stages of the writing process. I would also 
like to thank Professor Lynn Foster for serving as my note advisor and for her invaluable 
editorial recommendations. Finally, I am especially grateful to my friends and family mem-
bers for their constant support and encouragement. 
 227. The following statutory proposal was drafted primarily by compiling statutory provi-
sions enacted in other states that would help clarify trust protection in Arkansas. See statutes 
cited supra notes 53, 54. Commentary provided by the authors cited supra notes 2, 7, 17, 22, 
25, and 33 was also influential, particularly with respect to liabilities. 
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The powers and duties of a trust protector shall be as provided in the 
governing instrument and binding on all other persons. With the excep-
tion of subsection (a)(4), this section shall apply to a trust instrument on-
ly to the extent that its provisions are not superseded by the trust instru-
ment: 
(a) A trust protector, other than a trust protector who is a beneficiary of 
the trust, is subject to the following: 
(1) The terms of a trust may provide that a trust protector 
may exercise his or her powers in a nonfiduciary capacity. If 
the governing instrument is silent in this regard, the trust pro-
tector is a fiduciary to the extent of the powers, duties, and 
discretion granted to him or her under the terms of the trust. 
(2) If the trust protector, whether appointed by the settlor or 
a preceding trust protector, is operating as a fiduciary, he or 
she shall owe the duties associated therewith to: 
(i) The settlor of the trust while the settlor is still 
living, and 
(ii) The beneficiaries of the trust if the settlor of 
the trust is no longer living. 
(3) So long as the trust protector acts in his or her capacity 
as trust protector, the trust protector is subject to the follow-
ing in exercising or refraining from exercising any power or 
duty: 
(i) The trust protector shall exercise reasonable 
care in exercising any administrative or non-
discretionary duty or power, and 
(ii) The trust protector shall act in good faith and 
in accordance with the purposes for the trust as ev-
ident by the governing instrument in exercising 
any other duty, power, or discretion. 
(4) A term of a trust that relieves a trust protector from his 
or her liability for breach of his or her fiduciary duties is un-
enforceable to the extent that either of the following applies: 
(i) The term relieves the trust protector of liabil-
ity for acts committed in bad faith or with reckless 
indifference to the purposes of the trust, or 
(ii) The term was inserted as the result of an 
abuse by the trust protector of a fiduciary or confi-
dential relationship to the settlor. 
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(5) The trust protector is liable for any loss that results from 
the breach of his or her fiduciary duties, but not for loss that 
results from the breach of his or her nonfiduciary duties enu-
merated in the governing instrument. 
(6) The trust protector is entitled to reasonable compensa-
tion for the performance of his or her fiduciary duties, but not 
for the performance of those duties held in a nonfiduciary ca-
pacity. 
(b) When the terms of a trust provide for a trust protector, all trustees 
responsible to the trust are subject to the following: 
(1) A trustee shall act in accordance with a trust protector’s 
exercise of the trust protector’s specified powers, and shall 
not be liable in doing so for any loss that results from any of 
the following: 
(i) The trustee’s compliance with a nonfiduciary 
direction
 
of the trust protector, 
(ii) The trustee’s failure to take any action that 
requires a prior authorization of the trust protector 
if the trustee timely sought but failed to receive the 
authorization, or 
(iii) Seeking a determination from the court re-
garding the trust protector’s actions or directions. 
(2) A trustee shall be liable for any loss that results from any 
of the following: 
(i) The trustee’s compliance with a direction of a 
trust protector that is contrary to the terms of the 
trust document, or 
(ii) The trustee’s compliance with a direction of a 
trust protector that would result in a fiduciary 
breach of the trust protector’s fiduciary duties. 
(3) A trustee shall account to the trust protector at the trust 
protector’s request. 
(c) Powers attributable to a trust protector may include, but are not lim-
ited to, the following: 
(1) Modify or amend the trust instrument to achieve favora-
ble tax status or respond to changes in the Internal Revenue 
Code, state law, or the rulings and regulations thereunder; 
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(2) Increase or decrease the interests of any beneficiaries to 
the trust; 
(3) Modify the terms of any power of appointment granted 
by the trust. However, a modification or amendment may not 
grant a beneficial interest to any individual or class of indi-
viduals not specifically provided for under the trust instru-
ment; 
(4) Remove and appoint a trustee; 
(5) Consent to a trustee’s action or inaction relating to in-
vestment of trust assets or in making distributions to benefi-
ciaries; 
(6) Terminate the trust; 
(7) Veto or direct trust distributions; 
(8) Change situs of the trust; 
(9) Appoint a successor trust protector; 
(10) Interpret terms of the trust instrument; 
(11) Advise the trustee on matters concerning a beneficiary; 
and 
(12) Amend or modify the trust instrument to take advantage 
of laws governing restraints on alienation, distribution of trust 
property, or the administration of the trust. 
(d) The powers provided pursuant to subsection (c) may be incorpo-
rated by reference to this section at the time a testator executes a will or a 
settlor signs a trust instrument, in whole or in part. 
(e) The provisions in this section are applicable to testamentary chari-
table trust settlements notwithstanding § 28-73-405. 
 
